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Framing the Prosecution  7/17/2013 draft   
Daniel Richman* 
 
The enormous value of Dan Simon’s In Doubt1 lies not just in its nuanced exploration of 
the challenges to accurate criminal fact finding but in its challenge to us to rethink trials 
themselves.  Even as we endeavor to give criminal defendants the means and license to raise 
reasonable doubts, we need to think more about when and how those doubts can be allayed.  Just 
because most jurisdictions have not come out of the first round of play – the one in which 
defendants get the tools to poke holes in the cases against them – doesn’t mean it’s premature to 
consider what should happen in the second period: What tools should we give jurors to assess the 
alleged holes – the “reasonableness” of an alleged doubt?  And how can the prosecution try to 
mend them?  These questions don’t simply go to the fairness and, to use Dan’s term, the 
diagnosticity of trials.  They also, as I hope to show here, go to the role that criminal trials will 
play in a world with so few of them. 
Metaphors are powerful tools for understanding complex phenomena – for “framing” 
them.2  And the “framing” metaphor itself, with its resonance of intentionality and contingent 
perception, is a powerful tool for understanding and reformulating the criminal trial.3  The 
thicket of procedural and evidentiary doctrines deployed in our trials is founded on the fear that 
the state will -- intentionally or insouciantly -- try to “frame” an innocent defendant.  That, 
among other reasons, is why the state must proceed first and meet a heavy burden of proof.  With 
the state’s responsibility for assembling a case and putting it on, however, comes a troubling 
advantage of which we were long aware but that recent cognitive science literature4 has driven 
home: having been presented with what seems like a nicely drawn picture of guilt – evidentiary 
pieces selected by the prosecutor, which coincidentally fit within a frame selected by her as well 
– the jury may not bother to look beyond it.   
There is a broad consensus in the literature -- even if reality has yet to catch up – that we 
need to ensure that defendants have a fair opportunity to challenge this evidentiary frame, so that 
they can expose the cognitive biases that infected the cops’ initial construction of the case and 
the prosecutors’ later assembly of it.  Understandably less thought, however, has been given to 
                                                     
*
 Paul J. Kellner Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.  This piece was presented at the “Criminal 
Law on the Crossroads Conference,” at the USC Gould School of Law, June 7, 2013.  Thanks to Jim Comey, 
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1
 Dan Simon, In Doubt: The Psychology of the Criminal Justice Process (2012). 
2
 George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (2003 ed.). 
3
 See Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames, Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47 Stan. L. 
Rev. 39 (1994). 
4
 See Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow 362-74 (2011). 
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the risk that, in doing so, defendants will “frame” cops and prosecutors.  No claim is made that 
this risk is of similar moral dimensions to the others.  But, it has systemic implications worth 
worrying about. 
Criminal trials are not the only, and may not even be the best, way to promote the 
competency and integrity of the police in the nearly 18,000 law enforcement agencies5 and the 
over 2,300 prosecutors’ offices6 around the country.  One could imagine a variety of non-
adjudicatory mechanisms, both outside these institutions and within them, could do the same 
thing.  From the outside, consulting firms could do random audits; inspector generals could poke 
around; state attorneys general – while generally lacking hierarchical control over county 
prosecutors -- could use habeas defense work as a basis for oversight; funders could look more 
carefully at how their money is spent; citizen commissions could have real informational 
gathering resources and powers . . . .  The list goes on.  From the inside, training, culture and 
office structure could be engaged to the same end.  And mutual monitoring between police and 
prosecutors7 could be fostered as well.  Yet given political and institutional realities, it is hard to 
imagine any combination of these quality control measures doing the fine-grained work across 
all jurisdictions that we rely on the adversary process to do.  At the same time, it’s hard to even 
pretend that the adversary process is operating at full throttle in the vast majority of criminal 
cases -- the cases in which the adjudicative process consists only in a negotiated guilty plea and a 
sentence.  So while trials may be the exception, they still provide the rule for police and 
prosecutorial conduct.  And even as we look to the fairness of trials to defendants, we should be 
more attentive to the signals trials send and the incentives they create for cops and prosecutors.   
Of course, trials aren’t particularly good signals to police and prosecutors of the quality 
of their work.  Even with most cases pleading out, the average trial will end in a guilty verdict.   
And if one considers all the choices made (or negligently foregone) in the course of an 
investigation and trial, the likelihood that one or more enforcers involved in the case made one or 
more, possibly cascading, mistakes is considerable, and the likelihood that a jury verdict will 
reflect that mistake, pretty small.  Were enforcers to start thinking of trials as the only assessment 
of their work that matters, the insensitivity of this mechanism would surely promote 
overconfidence and sloth.8  Still, even as we promote alternative, non-adjudicatory mechanisms, 
we can work to promote greater sensitivity. 
These signals and incentives are the focus of this essay, which proposes a quiet reframing 
of trials as regulatory interventions into a sparsely regulated world. 
                                                     
5
 Brian A. Reaves, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008, at 2 
(2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf 
6
 Steven W. Perry, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prosecutors in States Courts, 2005 (2006) (2,344 offices prosecuting 
felony cases in states courts of general jurisdiction).  The federal system has prosecutors housed in Washington and 
in the offices of the 93 U.S. Attorneys around the country. 
7
 Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 749  (2003). 
8
 Michael Farbiarz (whose cases probably involve thousands of decisions) raised this nice point. 
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Deconstructing the Investigative Frame 
Consider the classic criminal trial drama: A few eyewitnesses will testify.  Police officers 
will tell of having conducted a search or two, perhaps pursuant to their arrest of the defendant, 
and will authenticate physical evidence that they seized.  An officer will tell of the defendant’s 
post-arrest statements (since he probably waived his Miranda rights.)  Perhaps someone from the 
police lab will attest to a “match” between biological material found at crime scene and the 
defendant.  And maybe a co-conspirator will take the stand, in hopes of receiving (or maybe after 
already having received) sentencing leniency. This parade of prosecutorial witnesses remains 
pretty standard, and their testimony, pretty predictable.  But at least to those who have kept 
abreast with developments in forensic and cognitive science, our understandings of how this 
evidence should be assessed have changed radically. 
 In part because the surveillance state so feared by privacy champions works far better on 
TV than in reality, eyewitnesses will continue to star in criminal trials for the foreseeable future.  
Notwithstanding fevered talk of omnipresent surveillance cameras, transit and vehicle tracking, 
and cellular tower triangulation, any wholesale rejection or even deep-discounting of eyewitness 
testimony would put all too many serious crimes beyond legal sanction.9 Still, we have 
increasing concerns about the reliability of eyewitness testimony when it is based on fleeting, 
stressed, and cross-ethnic observations, and those concerns only grow when investigating 
authorities aren’t careful in their recovery efforts.10  Moreover, the possibility of investigator 
contamination when memories are retrieved and reconstructed is not limited to fleeting 
observations.  While a workplace or accomplice witness might be justifiably more certain about 
whom he saw, he may have the same uncertainty or susceptibility to manipulation as to what he 
heard and saw, and when.  And the manipulation can come at the witting or unwitting hands of 
prosecutors – during proffers or trial preparation -- as well as cops.11  Nor are confessions and 
witness statements (from eyewitnesses and others) the only kinds of evidence that cops and 
prosecutors can taint.  Physical evidence can be lost, contaminated, or otherwise mishandled by 
those that collect it, process it, and, to the extent someone bothers, tests its.  Lab results can be 
mistaken, misleadingly presented, or just plain fabricated.12  And we are increasingly aware of 
                                                     
9
 For an NIJ sponsored survey of, inter alia, police interest surveillance systems, see John Gordon IV, et al., Keeping 
Law Enforcement Connected: Information Technology Needs from State and Local Agencies, 11 (RAND 2012), 
available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2012/RAND_TR1165.pdf 
10
 See Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth Loftus, Eyewitness Memory for People and Events, in Handbook of Psychology, 
Forensic Psychology, vol. 11, ch. 25, 617, 617 (2013) (useful metaphor of “memory as trace evidence”).  See Dan 
Simon, supra at 90-119 (collecting eyewitness literature). 
11
 See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 
68 Ford. L. Rev. 917 (1999); also see Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Defendants: The Costs and Benefits of 
Purchasing Information from Scoundrels, 8 Fed. Sent. Rptr. 292 (1996); Bruce A. Green, “The Whole Truth?: How 
Rules of Evidence Make Lawyers Deceitful, 25 Loyola LA L. Rev. 699 (1992). 
12
 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC 
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009), available at 
http://ag.ca.gov/meetings/tf/pdf/2009_NAS_report.pdf ; Michael R. Bromwich,  Final Report of the Independent 
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how the selective process of case construction can fall victim to what Dan Simon has labeled 
“biased reasoning processes.”13 
 That human activities are subject to human fallibility isn’t news, I hope.  The challenge, 
so nicely framed by Dan, however, is of the “limited diagnosticity” of an enterprise that relies on 
self-selected humans to collect and select data and on dragooned members of the public to assess 
it.  Yet the challenges to diagnosticity go beyond that. Sure, criminal defendants are presumed 
innocent – a bedrock principle so celebrated by popular legal culture that it infects discussions 
where it should have little place.14  Yet I don’t think we give sufficient attention to the cognitive 
dissonance the presumption demands of jurors. In what other context do we set up a politically 
accountable bureaucracy (like the police or a prosecutor’s office), ask citizens to take a political 
interest in its functioning, and then ask some of those same citizens to "presume" that the same 
bureaucrats have acted at a rate at or below chance in the particular case before them? No, I’m 
not claiming that jurors necessarily trust the police (I work near the Bronx after all15), nor that 
district attorneys necessarily have robust political accountability.16  Indeed, in a country in which 
criminal justice is primarily a county-based enterprise, even the average citizen/juror’s baseline 
views about police and prosecutorial sorting powers will surely be geographically specific.  Nor 
am I embracing the idea that jury trials should be implicit case-crossing referendums on a police 
force’s professionalism, though I’m not sure that would be such a bad thing, given how 
unaccountable police departments can be.17  The point is simply to highlight the fundamental 
tension between the development of trust and legitimacy by local authorities18 and the skepticism 
that we celebrate as the heart of our criminal trials. 
 Even if prosecutors didn’t come before juries with a democratic wind at their backs, their 
ability to select and prepare their cases and their control over the order of proof could make even 
the most doubt-promoting investigation seem eminently reasonable and adequate.  Insiders have 
always known that the seamless trial testimony that witnesses (especially police officers) give on 
direct examination is an artifact of specific trial preparation and general training.  But we are all 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Investigator for the Houston Police Department Crime Laboratory and Property Room (2007), 
http://www.hpdlabinvestigation.org/   
13
 Simon, supra, at 37. 
14
 See Daniel C. Richman, Overcriminalization for Lack of Better Options: A Celebration of Bill Stuntz , 64, 85-86 
in The Political Heart of Criminal Procedure: Essays on Themes of William J. Stuntz (Michael Klarman, David 
Skeel & Carol Steiker, eds. 2012)(citing example from Clarence Thomas confirmation hearing). 
15
 See Ailsa Chang, Cycle of Mistrust Leaves Crimes Unprosecuted in the Bronx, WNYC News, Aug. 22, 2012, 
http://www.wnyc.org/articles/wnyc-news/2012/aug/22/bronx-da-2/; see also William Glaberson, Faltering Courts, 
Mired in Delays, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 2013, at __ (noting that “Bronx jurors are famously skeptical of the police” 
and that, in 2011, “Bronx prosecutors won only 46 percent of their jury trials”). 
16
 See Daniel Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability, 83 Va. L. Rev. 
939, 963 (1997)  (on limited electoral accountability of district attorneys). 
17
 See David Alan Sklansky, Democracy and the Police (2007).  It’s hard to allude to the case-crossing referenda on 
police -- particularly in a Los Angeles conference -- without mentioning the OJ Simpson case. 
18
 See Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in 
Their Communities, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 231 (2008). 
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too inured to the charade we present jurors: the witnesses who appear months, even years, after 
an event and deliver personal narratives, prompted only by non-leading questions, that shed 
potent light on the transactions in dispute; the memories that are suddenly “refreshed” with a 
glance at a document, and the notion of an investigation without loose and dead ends.  In the 
hands of a competent prosecutor, the case against the defendant, however cobbled together 
beforehand, unfurls like a testamentary scroll. 
 The deconstruction of the prosecution’s case and the investigation that preceded it is thus 
not just a defense tactic19 but a necessary part of the inquiry into reasonable doubt.  While that 
standard is rooted in the distant world explored so nicely by Jim Whitman20 (one long before the 
rise of professional criminal investigators), our current understanding of it offers a capacious 
analytical framework well suited to second-guessing the official story and exposing the choices 
made and foregone by those purporting to present a burnished story of guilt.21  In addition to 
deconstructing the prosecution’s case, a defendant will want to offer a counter-narrative, and 
“The cops jumped to conclusions” may be the best he can do.22  Indeed, while several 
experienced practitioners at this Conference reported that this line of defense can alienate jurors, 
it may be a defendant’s only possible entry in the contest for “relative plausibility” (as Ron Allen 
and Alex Stein nicely put it).23 
The defendant, of course, will be the primary beneficiary if his lawyer can successfully 
deconstruct the prosecution’s case.  And society will avoid the unjust conviction of someone in 
its name.  Yet trials are too rare and expensive, and alternative mechanisms of accountability all 
too limited, for us to ignore the contributions cutting across cases that trials can make to the 
regulation of a county or district’s criminal justice system.  
We can’t pretend that trials are random audits.  While a market-clearing price may not 
always be available in our guilty-plea driven system,24 it usually is.  On hearing that a criminal 
                                                     
19
 See Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Literary Criticisms of Law, 261-63 (2000); add cites 
20
 James Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Theological Roots of the Criminal Trial (Yale, 2008); see also 
Andrea Roth, Defying DNA: Rethinking the Role of the Jury in an Age of Scientific Proof of Innocence, (2013 
SSRN draft) 
21See Sherwin, supra note __, at 68 (describing strategy in which “[t]he defense attempts to attack the prosecutor's 
history, impeach the credibility of the state's witnesses, and deconstruct the linear narrative that the prosecutor 
offers, breaking it up until it is transformed into a nonsensical, incredible tale too full of inconsistencies and loose 
ends to withstand the onslaught of reasonable doubt.”).  Breaking the prosecutorial frame can also be a critical part 
of the defense case in a capital sentencing phase, see John M. Hagedorn & Bradley A. MacLean, Breaking the 
Frame: Responding to Gang Stereotyping in Capital Cases, 42 Univ. of Memphis L. Rev. 1027 (2012). 
22See Sherwin, supra note __, at 55 (“The defense must buttress any uncertainty it induces with something stable, or 
risk sending the jurors scurrying for any scrap of certainty the prosecution offers. And to be sure, the prosecution 
will be offering certainty.”). 
23 Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 54 Ariz. L. Rev. __ (2013) 
(forthcoming) (explaining how fact finders rely not on fancy probabilities but on a natural reasoning process that 
compares the relative plausibility of each side’s explanation of the evidence), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2245304 
24
 See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L. J. 1909 (1992).  Thus, in the 
absence of good model, efforts to extrapolate data on investigative pathologies from exonerations in murder and 
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case went to trial almost anywhere in the US, one’s first thought is to wonder why, and the 
answer is as likely to be about the sentencing consequences or the defendant’s personal 
circumstances as about the closeness of the case or the weakness of the evidence.  Still, just as 
(in part for lack of effective alternatives) we embrace the exclusionary rule for the incentives it 
gives the police to comply with the Constitution, so should we embrace trials as sites for 
identifying and punishing specific instances of shoddy police work, and perhaps even 
acknowledging jobs well done.  As the “diagnosticity” of trials will inevitably go to 
investigations as well as guilt, we should embrace that duality as a feature, not a bug, of our 
criminal justice regime.  Victims should not feel like they are on trial; police and prosecutors 
definitely should.  And the Second Circuit quite rightly rebuked the prosecutor who, in rebuttal 
summation, urged the jury: “this is not a search for reasonable doubt.  This is a search for 
truth.”25 Truth is indeed important. But reasonable doubt is the way we get there.26 
Our first challenge in criminal trials is thus to ensure that the sources of doubt are 
properly aired.  That means (1) giving defense counsel sufficient information about the conduct 
of the investigation so that they can critique and perhaps supplement it, and (2) making sure that 
counsel have the zeal, expertise, and resources to expose prosecutorial flaws to the jury and that 
judges have the patience to let them.  Then we also (3) need to give jurors the tools to assess 
what doubts are reasonable.27 
 How can we accomplish these goals? A large part of the solution is conceptually 
straightforward, even as the political and institutional obstacles can be enormous: Defense 
counsel need to get adequate information not just about what the prosecutor included in her case 
but about what she left out.  The amount of ink that been spilled on the inadequacies of the law 
governing prosecutorial disclosure and on the all-too-frequent failure of prosecutors to comply 
                                                                                                                                                                           
rape cases – where the felt need to pursue even a weak case may be greater – usually end up being exercises in 
rhetoric, not social science.  For a nice effort to sort through the data, see Samuel R. Gross, How Many False 
Convictions Are There?  How Many Exonerations Are There, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND 
MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE: CAUSES AND REMEDIES 
IN NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPEANS CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS, C. R. HUFF & M. KILLIAS EDS. 
(ROUTLEDGE:MARCH 2013, IN PRESS) (available at SSRN) 
25
 United States v. Williams, 690 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2012). 
26
 Id. The court explained: 
To say that “this is not a search for reasonable doubt” but “a search for truth” has the potential to distract 
the jury from the bedrock principles that “even if the jury strongly suspects that the government's version of 
events is true, it cannot vote to convict unless it finds that the government has actually proved each element 
of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” and “that if the evidence is insufficient to permit [the 
jury] independently to ‘find the truth,’ its duty, in light of the presumption of innocence, is to acquit.” 
[United States v.] Shamsideen, 511 F.3d [511 F.3d 340, 346–347 (2d Cir. 2008)]. The prosecution thus 
erred here by failing to frame the question for the jury “by reference not to a general search for truth but to 
the reasonable doubt standard that the law has long recognized as the best means to achieve the ultimate 
goals of truth and justice.” Id. at 347. 
 
27
 See Simon note __, at 195 (noting variation and inadequacy of “reasonable doubt” instructions across 
jurisdictions); see also State v. Stevenson, 298 P.3d 303 (Kan. 2013) (describing inelegant prosecutorial effort to 
distinguish between “beyond a reasonable doubt” and “beyond all doubt” during voir dire). 
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with their all-too-limited legal obligations is deservedly large,28 and I’ll not add to it here.  Even 
the most liberal disclosure reform proposals, however, won’t ensure that defense counsel gets 
what she needs.  Given the resource asymmetries in an adversarial system in which talk of 
“equity at arms” conceals more than it protects, prosecutors also need to have the zeal and 
competence to find critical evidence in the first place.  As anyone familiar with the Brady 
problem(s) in Connick v. Thompson knows, a constitutional disclosure obligation that looks to 
the forensic analyses that the prosecution has actually performed will be of little help when 
prosecutors are too lazy or inept to conduct tests that are as likely to help as to hurt their case, or 
when investigators are too lazy or inept to collect evidence in the first place.29    
Another conceptually straightforward, but practically daunting, part of the solution: 
defense counsel need to be adequately funded and have sufficient expertise and zeal.  More than 
fifty years after Gideon v. Wainwright, this goal remains distant.30  Retrospective relief for 
defendants ill-served by counsel is virtually impossible to get, not just because of Strickland v. 
Washington’s demanding standard but because of evidence of even clearly inadequate 
performance is unlikely to surface.  And ad hoc retrospective provision for what needs to be a 
critical ex ante assurance makes little sense, not just from a rights perspective, but from any 
reasonable perspective.  There is no substitute for a well-funded and motivated public defender 
organization (or collection of such organizations) within a county or district, able to collect 
information about police practices and bring it to bear across cases.  Even the most crime-control 
oriented should appreciate a system’s need for zealous and skilled quality inspectors ready to 
take on the confirmation biases and tunnel vision of police and prosecutors,31 but reliable 
institutional structures for such inspectors are rarely in place. 
Of course, the basis for finding doubt must also get to juries.32  This may seem obvious.  
Yet Supreme Court intervention was needed in Holmes v. South Carolina,33 where state law 
                                                     
28
 See, e.g., Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the Inference of Innocence, 100 
J. Crim. L. & Crim. 415 (2010); Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1533 (2010); 
Janet Moore, Democracy and Criminal Discovery Reform after Connick and Garcetti, 77 Brooklyn L. Rev. __ 
(2012); Ellen Yaroshefsky, New Orleans Prosecutorial Disclosure in Practice after Connick v Thompson,  Geo. J. 
Legal Ethics, 913, 919 (2012).  
29
 See Jennifer E. Laurin, Prosecutorial Exceptionalism, Remedial Skepticism, and the Legacy of Connick v. 
Thompson, in National Police Accountability Project, Civil Rights Litigation Handbook, 29, __ (2011) (discussing 
how Connick’s concession that a Brady violation occurred and most Justices’ consequent inattention to that point, 
left unanswered Justice Scalia’s plausible argument that no violation occurred when prosecutors failed to check 
whether Thompson’s blood type matched that on the victim’s pants), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1934250.  See also Jennifer E. Laurin, Way Forward, draft (get 
cite permission) at 26-27 (discussing inadequacies of police evidence collection). 
30
 See Joel M. Schumm, National Indigent Defense Reform: The Solution Is Multifaceted (2012) (Report of ABA 
and NACDL committees).  See also various symposia commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon v. 
Wainwright, e.g. 122 Yale L.J. Issue 8 (2013). 
31
 See Jen Laurin, Way Forward at 39-40 (citing literature). 
32
 While the focus here is on juries-- the usual fact finders in felony criminal trials -- the analysis here largely 
extends to bench trials as well.  See Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 165, 187 (2006) (“even judges are often afflicted with the kinds of cognitive failings that juries are, 
and that many of the same reasons that exist for imposing second-order exclusionary (or other) rules on juries’ 
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barred a defendant from introducing evidence of third-party guilt if the prosecution had 
“introduced forensic evidence that, if believed, strongly support[ed] a guilty verdict.”34  As the 
Court noted there, an evaluation of “the strength of only one party’s evidence” allows no “logical 
conclusion [as to] the strength of contrary evidence offered by the other side to rebut or cast 
doubt.”35  Put differently, the “reasonableness” of the narrative frame proposed by the 
prosecution can hardly be assessed without reference to the dots just outside of it.   
Holmes should not be expected to remove the temptation to construct judicial walls 
around the prosecution’s case.36 The trial structured around the prosecution narrative of the 
defendant’s guilt can easily spin out of control when the defendant responds by pointing at 
someone else or simply persons unknown. As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
explained: “[T]he admission of feeble third-party culprit evidence poses a risk of unfair prejudice 
to the Commonwealth, because it inevitably diverts jurors' attention away from the defendant on 
trial and onto the third party, and essentially requires the Commonwealth to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the third-party culprit did not commit the crime.”37 
At the very least, however, we should ensure that courts are receptive to defense 
challenges to the adequacy of the police’s investigation.  The Massachusetts SJC explained the 
difference:  
While the inference to be drawn from third-party culprit evidence is simply that someone 
else committed the crime, the inference that may be drawn from an inadequate police 
investigation is that the evidence at trial may be inadequate or unreliable because the 
police failed to conduct the scientific tests or to pursue leads that a reasonable police 
investigation would have conducted or investigated, and these tests or investigation 
reasonably may have led to significant evidence of the defendant's guilt or innocence. A 
jury may find a reasonable doubt if they conclude that the investigation was careless, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
first order epistemological assessments also apply to the arguments for imposing second-order rules on the 
first-order epistemological assessments of judges.”). 
33
 547 U.S. 319 (2006). 
34
 Id. at 321. 
35
 Id. at 331. 
36
 See Birts v. State, 2012 Ark. 348 (2012); State v. Mitchell, 2010 Me. 73 (2010).  The Missouri Supreme Court, for 
example, recently adhered to its “direct connection” rule: 
 
“To be admissible, evidence that another person had an opportunity or motive for committing the crime for 
which a defendant is being tried must tend to prove that the other person committed some act directly 
connecting him with the crime. The evidence must be of the kind that directly connects the other person 
with the corpus delicti and tends clearly to point to someone other than the accused as the guilty person. 
Disconnected and remote acts, outside the crime itself cannot be separately proved for such purpose; and 
evidence which can have no other effect than to cast a bare suspicion on another, or to raise a conjectural 
inference as to the commission of the crime by another, is not admissible.” 
 
State v. Nash, 339 S.W.2d 500, 513 (2011) (quoting State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 848 (Mo. banc 1998)). 
37
 Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 800-01 (2009) (citations omitted);  
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incomplete, or so focused on the defendant that it ignored leads that may have suggested 
other culprits.38 
As a matter of logic, this sort of proof might be on equal, or even lesser, footing with 
third-party culprit evidence on the issue of defendant’s guilt.  Save for cases of bad faith in 
which the police consciously disregard an investigative lead, it is not obvious that a potential 
“dot” known but not pursued should bear more on doubt than a “dot” indicative of non-guilt that 
the police didn’t know of.  Yet proof of investigative deficiencies is considerably more 
manageable as a practical matter.  Since prosecutors are less likely to be completely blindsided 
(assuming they communicate with the cops), the risk of fabrication is lower.39  Moreover, as the 
Massachusetts SJC later noted: “[B]ecause the Commonwealth may generally, on redirect 
examination, explain why particular leads were not followed, the risk of prejudice posed by 
[such alternative suspect] evidence is often lower than that associated with third-party culprit 
evidence.”40  Yet wariness about the framing power of the prosecution’s case should counsel 
courts to be more receptive to both kinds of proof. 
Attentiveness to the trial role as systemic regulatory device, however, does not mean that 
judges should completely abstain from regulating defense efforts to poke holes in the fabric of 
the prosecution’s case.  The concern isn’t simply that court and jury time ought not be wasted by 
clock-running.  Or that there’s a difference between poking holes and blowing smoke.  It is also 
to create a judicially patrolled space between what defense counsel knows and what he can use -- 
a space that counsel can’t be counted on to create on her own.  Here is where the dynamic 
aspects of disclosure and evidence come into play.  While I realize it’s an unsupported 
behavioral and predictive claim, I suspect that prosecutors might be more ready to memorialize 
and disclose investigative tracks, including roads not taken, to defense counsel if they had 
confidence that objectively silly lines of cross would not be pursued in court. 
Take a recurring page from federal practice and consider a potential cooperator’s first 
proffer session with the government: Odds are that he will initially minimize his culpability.  
After some eye-rolling and prodding by his lawyer or the government, perhaps he’ll come clean 
in this session.  Perhaps it will take another one before he does so.  (Yes, I realize that 
assessments of “clean” are contestable.)  When the government eventually calls him as a trial 
witness, it will need to disclose “material” exculpatory and impeachment material under Brady 
(even if not written down) and all memorized statements, but not non-Brady material that isn’t 
written down.41  To what extent should the prosecutor who worries that even the slightest 
inconsistency between the cooperator’s initial statements and trial testimony will provide grist 
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 Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 800-01 (2009) (citations omitted); see also United States v. 
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 Commonwealth v. Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 439 (2012). 
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for tedious cross-examination take careful notes?  A strict Baysian might want to assure the 
prosecutor that immaterial inconsistencies or natural narrative evolutions would be treated as 
such by the jury, and that she therefore needn’t worry about disclosure: A savvy defense lawyer 
wouldn’t bother to pursue the matter, and an inept one would find no profit in it.  Indeed, weak 
impeachment of this might even strengthen the jury’s assessment of the witness’s credibility and 
the prosecution’s case more generally.42  Still, risk aversion and effort minimization combine to 
deter memorialization. Would judicial restriction of that cross remove this disincentive?  I’m 
certainly not sure, but it would be worth a try, given the current dynamics, particularly on the 
federal side, where the luxury of a lighter caseload and the freedom that certain agents and 
prosecutors have to pursue sustained investigations reduces their (perceived) need to create aids 
to memory.43  And I suspect (but cannot prove) that attention to such disincentives might 
similarly promote disclosure of other investigative matters.  We regularly use evidentiary rules to 
create space for and foster socially valuable internal processes,44 and the intervention here would 
be with respect to use at trial, not disclosure. 
A call for more thoughtful judicial management of impeachment is not a call for a 
curtailment of cross-examination or defense evidence designed to make the police and 
prosecutors look bad.  That project, after all, goes to the heart of “reasonable doubt.”  And 
defense efforts to explore investigative short-cuts, leads not pursued, and forensic tests not 
ordered should be welcomed.  Judicial hostility to such efforts arises not simply from the desire 
to move a trial along but from the same habituation to routine and internalization of resource 
limitations that cause the investigative inadequacies in the first place.  The notion that “we don’t 
that type of thing in these types of cases” or “that never works” is as likely to be accepted by the 
judge -- who as a former prosecutor or defense lawyer is used to what is “normal” -- as by the 
investigators.   But the relatively few trials we have provide occasions for questioning the 
“normal.”  And if we are to embrace the retail inquiry of a trial not just as a means of assessing a 
particular defendant’s guilt but as an opportunity to audit investigative decision-making, judges 
should not shut down awkward questions about work undone. 
Note that the last two paragraphs have contradictory implications for judicial 
gatekeeping.  Yet such balancing is precisely what we pay trial judges the big bucks to do.  
Blindness to the effects of trial management on the cases that don’t go to trial won’t prevent 
them from occurring.  And there is no escaping the normative: When defense counsel wants to 
inquire into the failure of investigators to search NSA electronic intercepts in a local burglary, 
                                                     
42
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Wash & Lee L. Rev. 1609 (2003); also see Dan Kahan, The Economics—Micro-, Behavior, and Political—of 
“Subsequent Remedial Measures” Evidence, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1116 (2010). 
11 
 
judicial responses ranging from eye-rolling to explicit signaling that the jury’s time is being 
wasted are appropriate.  When, in a case involving a line-up or photo array, counsel wants to ask 
about the failure to use sequential identification procedures,45 judicial curtailment should be 
deemed an abuse of discretion.  When the defendant wants to play all six hours of a videotaped 
interrogation,46 reasonable minds might differ.  Close calls should, of course, favor the 
defendant.  As the Connecticut Supreme Court recently noted, even while conceding that 
“conducting a thorough, professional investigation is not an element of the government's case,” 
A defendant may, however, rely upon relevant deficiencies or lapses in the police 
investigation to raise the specter of reasonable doubt, and the trial court violates his right 
to a fair trial by precluding the jury from considering evidence to that effect. See 
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-86 (1980) (trial court improperly 
instructed jury not to consider evidence of investigators' failure to perform certain 
scientific tests when defendant's presentation at trial focused on raising inference that 
"police had contrived much of the case against him" and he emphasized that failure "in 
order to call into question the integrity of the police investigation") . . . .  
State v. Collins, 299 Conn. 567, 600-601(2011). 
 
If we are trying to promote correct jury valuation of defense evidence, we might also 
consider how defense counsel use proof or leads disclosed to them by prosecutors, pursuant to a 
constitutional, statutory, or institutional obligation.  When defense counsel, either in her own 
case or on cross, introduces or alludes to, say, a statement or witness disclosed pretrial by the 
prosecution but not thus far introduced, one can imagine at least three possible jury assessments 
(or some combination thereof) when the jury doesn’t realize where the proof came from.  Two 
are: “If the prosecutor missed this, her investigation must have been pretty shoddy or one-sided,” 
and “if the prosecutor knew about this and didn’t tell us, our prior base-line confidence in 
government regularity needs to be recalculated.”   If they don’t know from where defense 
counsel got the proof, jurors might easily misassess prosecutorial thoroughness or integrity. Of 
course, defense counsel might himself clarify the source of the evidence to prevent jurors from 
speculating in a third direction: that notwithstanding the absence of a burden, defense counsel 
looked hard for evidence to undercut the prosecution’s case, and this and other such proof was 
the best he could find.47  I’m not arguing for a particularly protocol governing disclosed 
evidence, simply that serious attention to the jury as diagnostician of reasonable doubt and 
assessor or investigative adequacy may require us to do more to clarify the source of evidence. 
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 Ensuring that trial juries are given evidentiary grist for finding doubt will not be enough 
if we don’t equip them to productively think about what doubts are reasonable.  At the very least, 
juror doubts ought not be dispelled with gratuitous, even misleading, instructions.48  Faced with 
defense arguments about forensic tests not pursued, some prosecutors are tempted to request 
“anti-CSI effect” instructions.  The theory is that defendants should be prevented from tapping 
into the so-called “CSI effect,” which supposedly leads jurors to expect real investigations to be 
as exhaustive and sophisticated as those on TV.  It’s not at all clear that there is a CSI effect for 
prosecutors to worry about.49  Far clearer is the risk – recognized by some courts in recent 
years50 -- that some variant of the anti-CSI instruction will relieve the prosecution of its burden 
of proof.  The question is not whether the prosecution is legally required to use any particular 
investigative technique or conduct any particular forensic analysis.  Rather it is whether, in the 
context of the case, the jury will take an authoritative judicial denial of any such legal obligation 
as a conclusive excusal of investigative inadequacies.   
Here, again, a balance must be struck that might vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, 
even from county to county.51  We certainly don’t want the police to practice the law 
enforcement version of “defensive medicine,” ordering unneeded expensive tests to satisfy 
unreasonable jury expectations.  But where the adequacy of an investigation is hotly contested, 
even the most anodyne judicial expressions concerning the prosecution’s investigative burden 
are fraught, and, particularly when their systemic effects are considered, ought to be deployed 
with more care. 
Indeed, we need to think more generally about the mix of permitted argument, case-
specific expert evidence and both tailored and general judicial instruction that juries need to 
properly assess the strength of the prosecution’s case.52  Doors hitherto closed on defense lines of 
attack are slowly starting to open, to various degrees in various jurisdictions.  The Connecticut 
Supreme Court, for example, recently reversed itself and joined a growing number of courts 
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holding that qualified expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications does not 
“invade the province of the jury.”53  Cautionary instructions on eyewitness testimony will soon 
become more common,54 as will (perhaps) cautionary instructions when police have failed to 
videotape an interrogation from which statements have been introduced.55  We may even see 
expert testimony on how certain interrogation techniques combine with psychological factors to 
generate false confessions.56 
One hardly wants to declare victory in battles that are far from over in so many 
jurisdictions.  And, but for the fact that so few will read this piece, I would worry that the best 
could be the enemy of the good, particularly in a world where defendants and reformers bear the 
burden of persuasion.  Still, at least in our insulated circles, we need to consider the trade-offs 
among these pedagogical measures.  One doubts there is a single optimal mix for all 
jurisdictions.  On the other hand, considerations of judicial management argue for appellate 
courts to make some choices.  A fact-sensitive “totality of the circumstances” approach57 that 
defers to trial court discretion on the appropriate mix of argument and instructions will, given the 
press of business, likely drive the problem under the rug, with most efforts, when contested, 
simply affirmed on appeal.  And however much one applauds the readiness of more courts to 
allow expert testimony in these areas, such resource-intensive retail moves can offer only 
sporadic relief.   
Having opened the door to a few educational experts, we thus need to think beyond them.  
(I distinguish “educational” experts from qualified “hard” forensic science experts testifying to 
DNA or other such testing).  Resource concerns argue for top-down measures like pattern 
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 State v. Guilbert, 306 Conn. 218 (2012); Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 791 (2009) 
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instructions promulgated at wholesale level.  While there is evidence that jurors don’t fully 
absorb instructions,58 those studies don’t adequately consider that the relevant “treatment” is not 
just the giving of instructions but their deployment by counsel in argument (or their effective 
preclusion or weakening of certain counter-arguments).59  The next goal will be to hard-wire 
what we have learned from experts into the trial process, to ensure that they are used more 
equitably and perhaps more sparingly.   Indeed, the highest and best use of their expertise may be 
to inform investigations, not trials. 
Defending the Case? 
The focus so far – both in the developing case law and this essay – has been to ensure 
that defendants are given a fair chance to expand the tight evidentiary frame proffered by the 
prosecution: to show the pieces that don’t fit and the ones that were crammed in.  And that is the 
appropriate place to start.  To be sure, the asymmetry of appellate relief – there being no appeal 
from acquittals – means that challenged restrictions on defense efforts will necessarily loom 
larger than restrictions on the prosecution in the reported cases.  But notwithstanding the 
challenge of rigorous empirical proof, I’d be surprised if courtroom denizens of any jurisdiction 
had confidence that grist for reasonable doubt was regularly exposed and pursued, or that they 
thought that prosecutors were more likely than defense counsel to be disadvantaged by restrictive 
rulings and instructions. 
It’s not premature, however, to start thinking about how the prosecution should be 
allowed to respond to expansions of its evidentiary frame, and about the extent to which those 
responses can expand the frame yet further.  There are several reasons to do so.  First, judges 
who had a clearer sense of how and when prosecutors could explain away an alleged deficiency 
would surely be more receptive to defense challenges in the first place. (My underlying empirical 
assumption is that some combination of the umpirial ethic and the comfort of a spectator’s seat 
leads most judges to prefer that the adversary system run its course, so long as it moves 
smoothly.)  Second, whatever one’s optimal ratio of false positives to false negatives,60 there are 
at least some guilty defendants who one doesn’t want walking free.61  Finally, even if the 
radically unequal balance of power in American criminal justice systems (understandably) leads 
one to be unsympathetic to the prosecutor whose case is misleadingly tanked, the place of trials 
in the larger investigative ecosystem should make one worry about courtrooms where good 
police work gets pooled with bad in the minds of jurors.  Resources are always finite and 
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investigations will always be subject to the law of diminishing returns.  Some cases may need to 
be brought even they will never be “slam dunks.”  Still, wide variations in the competence and 
zeal of investigations are inevitable and, certainly from a systemic approach, we should equip a 
jury to discern where its case falls in that spectrum, and to distinguish the good from the bad. 
Some of this separation process is straightforward and barely noticed.  The police officer 
cross-examined on his failure to talk to more people at the crime scene can, on redirect, explain 
that there weren’t any. Where cross has suggested gaps in the chain of custody supporting a 
physical exhibit, a prosecutor can provide the links on redirect, call new witnesses, or wait until 
summation and suggest the absence of any reason to doubt evidentiary integrity.  The 
prosecution witness impeached with prior inconsistent statements can be rehabilitated through 
the introduction of prior consistent statements or redirect examination that allows the witness to 
explain the inconsistency away.62  The fuss defense counsel makes over the failure to obtain 
touch DNA results from a firearm can be met with testimony about the impossibility of doing so 
in this instance.  Expert testimony might be permitted to explain away what defense counsel 
suggested was curious victim behavior in sexual and domestic violence cases.63 
The process won’t always be easy, however.  We thus return to the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court’s reference in Commonwealth v. Bright to the prosecution’s freedom, on 
redirect to “explain why particular leads were not followed.”64  Sometimes trial courts will avoid 
the issue, conducting their own inquiry out of the jury’s presence and then rejecting defense 
evidence of a disregarded tip as unduly speculative.65  And when a prosecutor does offer an 
explanation, courts will likely give her some leeway, as the defendant was the one who opened 
the door (and the evidentiary frame).  Yet what happens when the real reason a tip was not 
pursued was “I’ve had considerable experience with this kind of case in this neighborhood, and 
the tip just didn’t make sense”?  Or “word on the street is that the guy pointing the finger at 
[third party] regularly talked trash about [third party]”?  A tough balance needs to be struck in 
these cases: Should the prosecution be hamstrung in its ability to respond to perfectly fair but 
answerable defense challenges, the jury won’t be able to assess the reasonableness of the doubt 
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that has been raised.  On the other hand, allowing the prosecution to freely offer explanations of 
this sort raises grave concerns about the deployment of official authority. 
Evidence doctrine has long tried – with various degrees of success across jurisdictions – 
to ensure that police officers don’t throw their weight around on the witness stand.  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court, in a case where a police officer expressed his opinion that an observed 
transaction was the drug sale, recently rejected the notion that “there is a category of testimony 
that lies between” “fact testimony, through which an officer is permitted to set forth what he or 
she perceived through one or more of the senses” and qualified expert testimony that “explain[s] 
the implications of observed behaviors that would otherwise fall outside the understanding of 
ordinary people on the jury.”66  Other courts have hewed to that line, for fear that the wide 
investigative knowledge of an officer will lead juries to be unduly deferential.67  How the 
legitimate concerns articulated in these cases can accommodate explanations that go to an 
investigation’s reasonableness needs far more thought.  If trials are to be intensive inquiries into 
the adequacy of case construction, investigators need to be able to explain their decisions with 
reference to the expertise that, one hopes, they have. 
 It’s worrisome enough if a police officer deploys his authority and expertise.  But at least 
he’s amenable to cross-examination, and lacks the status of the prosecutor in the courtroom -- the 
acknowledged representative of the “People,” “the Commonwealth,” or “the Government.”  So 
it’s probably worse when a prosecutor “vouches” for a witness by, say, suggesting that a police 
officer’s testimony should be believed because he’d get fired if he perjured himself.  As the 
Ninth Circuit recently explained: 
even when grounded in an inference from the evidence, a prosecutorial statement may 
nevertheless be considered impermissible vouching if it “place[s] the prestige of the 
government behind the witness” by providing “personal assurances of a witness's 
veracity” . . . .  Vouching of that sort is dangerous precisely because a jury “may be 
inclined to give weight to the prosecutor's opinion in assessing the credibility of 
witnesses, instead of making the independent judgment of credibility to which the 
defendant is entitled” . . .  It is up to the jury-and not the prosecutor-to determine the 
credibility of a witness' testimony.68  
 
The Court went on to note: “In that respect we stress that the ethical bar is set higher for the 
prosecutor than for the criminal defense lawyer -- a proposition that has been clear for at least 
seven decades. . . . .  Although to be sure no lawyer, either public or private, should lay his or 
her own credibility on the line by expressing his or her own opinion about a witness' 
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believability, the difference is that a private lawyer's impropriety in that respect carries no 
implication of official governmental support.”69 
 How then is the prosecution supposed to respond when defense counsel is permitted to 
introduce prior statements by the prosecutor’s office, or perhaps even another office, that 
undercut the view of the fact that the prosecution now urges the jury to accept?  While I don’t 
know how often the question comes up, it’s been posed a few times in the Second Circuit alone 
by cases reversing convictions based, in part, on a trial court’s failure to admit the prior, 
allegedly undercutting claims.70  In the cases I’ve found, the appellate court has found error in 
the trial court’s failure to admit the prior prosecutorial statements.  And one can cogently argue 
that juries should be alerted to public prosecutorial flip-flips on factual positions, as such 
reversals surely suggest the existence of some doubt.71  Prosecutors really are (or should be) 
experts on their cases and one might infer a lot from their assessments.  Or actions: Cynthia 
Jones recently suggested that juries be told about the government’s intentional violation of its 
constitutional disclosure obligations (should such violations come to light) and be allowed to 
infer “consciousness of a weak case.”72  If courts are to become more hospitable to these lines of 
defense argument, however, we need to give equal thought to permissible answers that will 
clarify (if possible) the alleged inconsistency.  This gets messy indeed.  I don’t doubt that a large 
prosecutor’s office could spare an assistant to testify: “Our initial view of the case was X, but 
after considering the following we became convinced that the correct view was Y.”  Whether this 
is a tolerable expansion of the evidentiary frame is another matter. Unless courts plan to relax 
the prohibition on prosecutorial vouching – and I don’t suggest any such thing – they need to 
recognize that opening the door to defendants on that score without keeping it open for 
prosecutors will come at the expense of either the truth-finding process or thoughtful 
prosecutorial decision making, or both. 
 One last thought as we consider smashing through the evidentiary frame to allow 
prosecutors to explain why the apparent holes in the case aren’t; why the apparent weakness, 
isn’t: The last decade has seen a growing literature on the cognitive distortions that may prevent 
police officers and prosecutors from seeing the deficiencies of their cases.73  And may it continue 
                                                     
69
 Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d. at 1148. 
70
 United States v. White, 692 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2012) (charging decisions by Queens DA’s Office as to other 
occupants of car with defendant now charged in federal case); United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 812 (2d Cir. 
1991); United States v. GAF, 928 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1991) (superseded bill of particulars).  I should disclose that 
this issue has been bugging me since I worked on the briefs for the government in Salerno and GAF.  See also 
Bellamy v. State, 403 Md. 308 (2008) (prosecution proffer from an accomplice’s plea hearing); Harris v. United 
States, 834 A.2d 106 (D.C. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Cardenas-Hernandez, 219 Wisc.2d 516 (1998) (prosecutor’s 
statements in prior court proceedings). 
71
 See Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Inconsistency, Estoppel, and Due Process: Making the Prosecution Get Its 
Story Straight, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1423 (2001);   
72
 Cynthia E. Jones, supra note __, at 422. 
73
  See Dan Simon, In Doubt, __; Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 
Colum. L. Rev. 749, 804 (2003); see also Alafair Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons 
of Cognitive  Science, 47 Wm. & M. L. Rev. 1587 (2006); The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal 
18 
 
to grow, for this is a critical challenge that can be addressed only through a mix of legal doctrine, 
institutional design, culture,74 and training.  We need more work, however, on how – outside the 
those cases in which forensic evidence, rightly done, allows a more rigorous approach to 
probability75 -- prosecutors can legitimately be convinced of guilt in a messy world of 
epistemological challenges and bureaucratic limitations.  And while we’re looking into this, we 
might want to consider the degree to which the responsible and professional prosecutor, being so 
convinced, can share the basis for her confidence before the jury. 
How does a prosecutor signal a careful, thoughtful investigation?  The weird 
"coincidence" in the trial testimony of two prosecution witnesses on some minor observation 
may be a misleading artifact of trial preparation, but all sorts of other coincidences that arise as 
the investigation actually unfolds are not.  If one thinks about how an investigator (rightly or 
wrongly) comes to believe he has the right person, it's the time sequence of statements and the 
varying contexts in which they were made that do much of the work.  The way an investigator 
(rightly or wrongly) comes to know a case is thus quite different from the way a jury (rightly or 
wrongly) comes to know a case. Should we embrace this difference or try to limit it?  When I 
was a prosecutor, I was struck by the challenge of showing the jury precisely what it was that led 
me to credit a witness's (particularly a cooperator’s) story.  To what extent would jurors' 
disagnostic capabilities be improved by giving them a better sense -- as a matter of course -- of 
how the actual investigation unfolded?   
As we might revisit (even if only to consider the costs of) restrictions we place on 
prosecutors’ appeal to their own authority, so should we be even more open to appeals to 
legitimate sources of epistemic authority outside of prosecutorial offices.  Jennifer Mnookin has 
sensibly suggested that the focus of forensic science testimony in court should be less on an 
expert’s description of his methodology and more on the extent to which the method he deploys 
has been adequately validated by appropriate empirical testing.76  Were we to adopt the salutary 
proposals of the National Academy of Science, establishing an independent oversight agency, 
clarifying best practices, and developing accreditation procedures for forensic laboratories 
around the country, a lab’s high status within that regime would be sort of evidence that a jury 
should hear.  Bolstering should still be limited.  I certainly don’t propose letting cops or 
cooperators freely testify as to their promotions or accolades (unless defense counsel is foolish 
enough to open the door).  But giving forensic experts license to display merit badges would 
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surely promote institutional efforts to earn them.  So would encouraging defense counsel to point 
out the absence of such badges. 
 By now, the wary reader doubtless worries that I’m pigheadedly overcompensating for 
the literature’s focus on unjust convictions and exonerations and proposing to turn trials into 
inquests, all in the name of fairness to prosecutors, who really don’t need help at all.  In fact, I 
worry myself, and certainly recognize that we should take care when we use trial rules to create  
systemic incentives.77  That said, extending Dan Simon’s ideas about trials’ diagnosticity for 
separating the guilty from the not guilty to a broader consideration of their capacity to sort the 
competent investigations from the incompetent offers promise without much risk.  What I’d 
recruit to the project of giving jurors better tools for assessing what doubts are reasonable is less 
Evidence doctrine writ large than the common law of evidentiary rulings.  Resetting their 
“mental dials,”78 trial judges would be more receptive to efforts to breach and repair the 
prosecutorial frame.   
 Is this too big an “ask” of trial judges?  Notwithstanding my general skepticism about 
criminal justice reforms at the trial level that rely on heroic efforts by hard-pressed trial judges 
(particularly given the heterogeneous composition and incentives of the US criminal trial 
bench79), I don’t think the reframing of the trial embraced here is over-ambitious.  Indeed, it’s 
more susceptible to condemnation as pathetically ameliorist, or simply a theorization of the 
status quo.  Courthouse cultures vary, as do the balances individual judges strike between 
moving cases along, deferring to party interest, and protecting the public.80  Yet there is good 
reason to think that operationalizing “doubt” in terms of investigative adequacy makes life 
easier, rather than harder, for all members of the courtroom working group.  
 But what about judicial gatekeeping competence? Or jury competence? How good is 
either likely to be at assessing investigative adequacy?  This challenge sounds like a fatal blow to 
the framing model, but it becomes glancing as soon as one takes our jury system as a given and 
asks how it can be most usefully be deployed. Even if one doesn’t think jurors (or judges) 
particularly good at discerning whether an investigation was up to snuff, the claim here is simply 
that they are better at that than at conducting a retrospective historical inquiry on the basis of 
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“primary sources” that have been raked through and even modified by adversarial parties.  Far 
from being an “outside the box” contribution, the model embraced here is of the existing box and 
its capabilities. 
 Appellate courts can promote the model, at least at the margin.  Because of asymmetric 
appellate rights, they would likely hear only defense claims about precluded challenges to the 
investigative process or, perhaps, inappropriate prosecutorial responses to, or preemptions of, 
those challenges.  But over time, they too would get a sense of the range of experimentation on 
both sides.  And should police and prosecutors respond to the possibility of more extensive 
audits by investing more responsibly in their investigations and clarifying the bases for those 
investment decisions, we will have achieved much. 
 Would evidence rulings be different, were judges to consider the reframing proposed 
here?  I suspect they would.  Frames matter.  And recognizing that trials are generally as much 
about the prosecution as about the defendant, perhaps even more, would be a good start.  So long 
as we ensure that both sides get a fair trial. 
